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Clower’s about-face regarding the ‘Keynesian Revolution’1 
Abstract: 
Robert W. Clower’s article “The Keynesian Counter-Revolution: A Theoretical Appraisal” 
(1965) deeply influenced the course of Keynesian macroeconomics by contributing to the 
transition from IS/LM macroeconomics to fix-price theories. Despite this influence, no 
scholar proposed to explain its origins, with the notable exception of Roger E. Backhouse and 
Mauro Boianovsky (2013). They explained that the 1965 piece was the result of an 
independent research program rooted in the works of Clower during the 1950s. My paper 
aims to offer an alternative explanation. It is synthesized in the metaphor of an about-face to 
stress that a theoretical break is at the origin of this contribution. This break, initiated in the 
early 1960s, is characterized by a double change in perspective (individual equilibrium vs. 
individual disequilibrium, and compatibility vs. incompatibility between Keynesian and 
Walrasian theories). The intellectual context, particularly Don Patinkin (1956; 1958), will be 
invoked to trace the roots of this about-face. Consequently, rather than independency and 
linearity, I argue that dependency and non-linearity are the two salient features of Clower’s 
intellectual path.  
JEL Codes: B2, D5 
Keywords: microfoundations of macroeconomics, disequilibrium theory, instability of the 
full employment equilibrium, Clower. 
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Introduction 
Robert W. Clower’s article “The Keynesian Counter-Revolution: A Theoretical 
Appraisal” (1965) deeply influenced the course of Keynesian macroeconomics by 
contributing to the transition from IS/LM macroeconomics to fix-price theories. Despite this 
influence, no scholars proposed to explain its origins, with the notable exception of Roger E. 
Backhouse and Mauro Boianovsky (2013). They explained that the 1965 piece was the result 
of an independent research program rooted in the works of Clower during the 1950s. My 
paper aims to offer an alternative explanation. It is synthesized in the metaphor of an about-
face to stress that the most salient feature of Clower’s intellectual path is its non-linearity. 
The “Counter-Revolution” paper is structured around two ideas, related to the notion 
of involuntary unemployment. The first idea was that John M. Keynes’ General Theory 
(1936) should be rooted in a disequilibrium framework. Clower argued that involuntary 
unemployment portrayed situations in which workers failed to realize their standard 
optimization programs because of labor market non-clearing. The second idea was that the 
integration of Keynes’ income analysis and Walrasian microeconomics was impossible. 
Clower stressed that in situations of involuntary unemployment, realized income was 
supposed to act as a constraint on workers’ decisions to consume. According to him, this 
would be impossible so long as the tâtonnement hypothesis and the standard theory of the 
consumer were retained. Clower inferred that attempts to provide Walrasian foundations to 
Keynesian macroeconomics proposed by John R. Hicks (1939), Oskar Lange (1944) and Don 
Patinkin (1956) were blind-alleys. An alternative microeconomics had to be conceived. 
Clower’s proposals were to introduce disequilibrium transactions in a general equilibrium 
model and to formulate the famous “dual-decision” hypothesis.   
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Backhouse and Boianovsky (2013) maintain that these ideas as well as the resulting 
proposals were the outcome of a research program that Clower developed during the 1950s, 
independently of Patinkin. They support this viewpoint thanks to the analysis of archival 
documents left by Clower at Duke University. In a series of unpublished manuscripts written 
in the mid 1950s, Clower formulated models in which he shaped various mechanical price and 
quantity adjustments. Backhouse and Boianovsky inferred that Clower was searching for “an 
alternative to the tâtonnement process” (2013: p. 49), a search leading naturally to the 
“Counter-Revolution” paper. Following Clower (1984)’s own afterthought on his earlier 
works, they distinguished three steps in his intellectual path. Considering as starting points his 
concern with “how markets work” and his dissatisfaction with the “excess-demand adjustment 
rules of established theory” (1984: p. 260), i) Clower would have been interested in the 
dynamics of  “stock-flow” models, a market theory in which the adjustment rules depended 
on the stocks and the flows of commodities; ii) this would have led him to search for an 
alternative to the tâtonnement process as evidenced by the mechanical price and quantity 
adjustments formulated in the “N-Seller” models; iii) this, in turn would have found an echo 
in the Keynesian context and would have given rise to the “Counter-Revolution” paper.  
Independency and linearity are therefore considered as the two salient features of 
Clower’s intellectual path. Both claims can be challenged in light of some characteristics of 
the models developed by Clower. The “dual-decision” hypothesis and Patinkin’s “spill-over” 
effect are based on the same logic. Patinkin described the behavior of entrepreneurs that failed 
to sell the quantity of goods they had planned. They would integrate the level of demand as an 
additional constraint and would redefine their labor demand. Clower described the income 
constraints imposed on workers’ consumption when they failed to sell the quantity of works 
they had planned, which is simply the symmetric effect. This complementarity was stressed 
by Robert Barro and Hershel I. Grossman (1971) who pieced together these two mechanisms 
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to formulate the seminal fix-price model. According to Goulven Rubin (2005), this 
complementarity was not a coincidence. He showed that Clower was deeply inspired by 
Patinkin to whom he borrowed most of his concepts. As regards the linearity of Clower’s 
intellectual path, it is enough to stress that the dynamic studies of “stock-flow” models fitted 
in the literature on tâtonnement economics. Lange (1944) and Paul A. Samuelson (1947) were 
his main references at that time. In view of this, it is difficult to imagine that the “stock-flow” 
market analyses paved the way for a reflection on non-tâtonnement and so, led to the 1965 
piece. 
Backhouse and Boianovsky (2013) distort Clower’s intellectual path because their 
analysis of the archives are incomplete and superficial. They ignore important works: 
Clower’s doctoral dissertation, a work prepared under Hicks’ supervision from 1949 to 1952; 
Introduction to Mathematical Economics (1957), a book devoted to “stock-flow” market 
analyses that Clower co-written with the mathematician Donald W. Bushaw; and “Keynes and 
the Classics: A Reinterpretation”, an unpublished manuscript probably written at the end of 
the fifties. Yet, these contributions are decisive to reveal the content and the aims 
contemplated in the three theoretical sequences identified by Backhouse and Boianovsky 
(2013). As it happens, the “stock-flow” models were the outgrowth of a project to microfound 
Keynesian macroeconomics that Clower outlined in his doctoral dissertation and developed 
until the publication of Introduction to Mathematical Economics. The “N-seller” models, 
mainly developed from 1954 to 1959, were the outgrowth of a project purporting to elaborate 
a theory of price determination allowing the unification of all forms of competition, from 
monopoly to perfect competition.  
In contrast to Backhouse and Boianovsky (2013), I claim that there was a deep break 
between these two theoretical projects and the disequilibrium theory formulated in the 1965 
piece. Indeed, in the 1950s, Clower was not interested by involuntary unemployment and, 
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more generally, by the issue raised by individual disequilibrium and its consequences. Then, 
up to 1960, he claimed that Walrasian and Keynesian theories were fundamentally 
compatible. In other words, the first Clower defended the equilibrium perspective and the 
kind of synthesis between Keynesian and Walrasian theories that he attacked in the 1965 
paper. That is why the first two theoretical projects developed by Clower are considered as 
part of a research phase (Phase I) distinct from those in which he built his disequilibrium 
interpretation of the General Theory (Phase II). Clower’s reconsideration of Keynesian 
economics, in a disequilibrium perspective, is a side effect of his reading of Money, Interest 
and Prices; his advocacy for a break with the Walrasian framework is explained by his own 
preoccupations for unstable dynamics and the contemporaneous developments of Patinkin 
(1956; 1958) and of Franck H. Hahn and Takashi Negishi (1962).  
1. Equilibrium and synthesis perspectives: Phase I (1949-1959) 
The development of Clower’s first research phase is here presented with particular attention to 
the intellectual context. It is argued that the related theoretical works are characterized by an 
equilibrium perspective and an ambition to synthesize Keynesian macroeconomics with the 
Walrasian general equilibrium theory.  
1.1 The “general theory of the trade cycle” (1949-1957) 
The first phase of Clower’s intellectual path opens with a project to provide microfoundations 
to Keynesian macroeconomics. Clower outlined it in his doctoral dissertation and developed it 
until 1957 through static and dynamic analyses of “stock-flow” models. These market models 
portrayed economies where the typical commodity was both consumed, produced, and held 
by individuals. They were deduced from microfoundations shaped by Clower in his doctoral 
dissertation in order to ground a theory of the trade cycle. This theory, inspired by Keynes 
(1936), was intended to include the post-Keynesian models as special cases. The rationale was 
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that its central feature, the articulation of stocks and flows, was the essence of capital 
accumulation processes. Two aspects of this project are here important. First, market-clearing 
is assumed all along the way. In the dissertation, when Clower turned to the issue of 
involuntary unemployment (which he considered as minor), he assumed a horizontal labor 
supply curve. So, Keynesian macroeconomics was compatible with market clearing, a 
perspective confirmed through Clower’s static and dynamic analyses of “stock-flow” models. 
Second, the microeconomics underlying “stock-flow” models was viewed as an extension of 
those found in Value and Capital. So, Clower considered that the Walrasian and Keynesian 
theories were compatible.   
1.1.1 Overview of the project
2
  
Clower’s doctoral dissertation Theories of Capital Accumulation with Special 
Reference to their Ability to Explain the Experience of the U.S since 1870 (1952) aimed to 
“lay the foundation of a general theory of capital accumulation” (1952: p. 11). Put bluntly, the 
ambition was to offer the microfoundations of a business cycle model which would include 
the theories of Keynes and post-Keynesians (Roy F. Harrod, 1939; Hicks, 1950) as special 
cases: 
The writer began by examining the general pure theory of economic behavior (as expressed e.g., in 
Value and Capital) in an attempt to discover whether that theory was in any way inadequate as a 
foundation for capital accumulation theory. After making appropriate alterations to the general theory, 
the writer tried to fit various recent theories of capital accumulation [Reference to Keynes (1936), 
Harrod (1939) and Hicks (1950)] into it as special cases (1952: p. 8). 
His “general theory of capital accumulation” resulted from a “reinterpretation” and an 
“extension of Keynes’ views on the theory of the trade cycle” (1952: p. 11). The 
reinterpretation consisted of explaining fluctuations thanks to the variations of liquidity 
                                                          
2
 For a detailed presentation of this project, see Plassard (2015). 
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preference instead of those of the marginal efficiency of the capital (1952: pp. 80-83). The 
extension consisted of broadening the liquidity preference theory to physical assets (1952: p. 
69) so that the trade cycles resulted from capital accumulation processes destabilized by 
speculative behaviors (1952: p. 79). To support this approach, Clower elaborated a 
macromodel structured on the articulation of stocks and flows of capital assets. In line with 
the liquidity preference theory, the valorization of the existing stock of capital assets was 
assumed to set the rate of interest (1952: p. 69). Depending on its level, there would be 
different flows of new investments and production. The point was that entrepreneurs’ 
valorization of the existing stock of capital assets was subject to violent and repeated changes, 
because of speculative behaviors (1952: p. 79). Accordingly, the levels of investment, 
production and capital assets would never reach stationary positions (1952: p. 89). The trade 
cycle resulted from this instability, structurally related to the coexistence of stocks and flows. 
According to Clower, the same was true in post-Keynesian business cycle models. The 
instability was closely related to the acceleration principle, a relation linking the flow of 
output and the stock of capital assets (1952: p. 11). He inferred that the relation between 
stocks and flows of capital assets was the essence of capital accumulation processes. Since it 
was literally at the heart of his macromodel, he claimed to have elaborated a general theory of 
the trade cycle (1952: p. 184).  
Clower intended to incorporate the relation of stocks and flows in the standard theory 
of choices and then, to undertake the derivation of Keynes and post-Keynesian business cycle 
models. To do so, he followed the main lines set out by Hicks in Value and Capital.
3
  He 
repeatedly referred to the formulation of a general equilibrium model to demonstrate the 
compatibility between economic behaviors and aggregates. Clower proposed the “producer-
consumer” theory of the firm to ground the “stock-flow” relation; that was inspired by the 
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 For an exhaustive presentation of Hicks’ method, see E.R Weintraub (1979). For a short presentation, see K.D. 
Hoover (2012). 
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works of Leonid Hurwicz (1946) and Van de Graaff (1950) and basically consisted of 
introducing asset holding in entrepreneurs’ programs. Yet he failed to offer a complete 
transcription of the resulting theory of markets; the connections between his theory of choices 
and aggregates remained essentially informal. This could explain at least partly why the jury 
refused to award him the degree of doctor when he submitted his dissertation, on May 1952. 
Retrospectively, Clower recognized that his thesis “was not in a form fit for publication” and 
“did not produce what he had hoped”.4 This would have led him to “develop healthier 
motivations”, staying “six months at home not only with Value and Capital but also with 
Pareto and Walras”.5 This orientation is confirmed by the publication of a series of papers 
devoted to the development of “stock-flow” market analyses: “Business Investment and the 
Theory of Prices” (1953), “Productivity, Thrift and the Rate of Interest” (1954), “An 
investigation into the Dynamic of Investment” (1954a) and “Price Determination in a Stock-
Flow Economy” (1954b). The last two paper were written with a mathematician specialized in 
dynamics, Don Bushaw.
6
 This marked the beginning of a collaboration which culminated 
with the writing of Introduction to Mathematical Economics (1957), a book fully devoted to 
“stock-flow” market analyses.  
The “stock-flow” models resulted from the recognition that at the microeconomic 
level, individuals made decisions concerning the quantities consumed, produced, and held for 
future disposal. A “stock-flow” market theory accounted for the determination of prices in 
abstract economies in which plans to produce and to consume goods in the current market 
period were distinguished from plans to hold the same goods at the end of the market period. 
                                                          
4
 The quotes are taken from a resume written by Clower in 1964. R. W Clower Papers, Box 1-2001-0088, 
Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library.   
5
 The quotes are taken from a first version of the introduction of “Money, Markets and Method: Essays in 
honor of R.W. Clower” (1999). R. W Clower Papers, Box 1-1999-0352, Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript 
Library.   
6
 Bushaw did his PhD in Mathematics under the supervision of Solomon Lefschetz, a mathematician specialized 
in topology. He defended his thesis in 1952. According to Mike Kallaher (professor at the WSU), his PhD 
contributed to the development of modern optimal control theory (see the WSU website). 
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Formally, there was a set of supply and demand functions (flow dimension) describing 
respectively the quantity produced and consumed during the current market period. And to 
that, Clower added a set of supply and demand functions (stock dimension) describing 
respectively the quantity inherited from the activities of past market periods and the quantities 
that individuals wanted to hold at the end of the current market period. Since the quantities 
inherited from the past were independent of current activities, Clower contended that the two 
sets of equations were independent. This meant that “a set of prices which equates flow 
supplies to flow demands, and so establishes flow equilibrium, may not also serve to equate 
stock supplies to stock demands, and so establishes stock equilibrium” (1953: p. 23). Two 
types of equilibria were therefore distinguished. The first one was temporary since the stocks 
available in the economy showed a tendency either to rise or to fall. For a given vector of 
prices, individuals would like to hold stocks of commodities different from the one inherited 
from the past. The stocks would be adjusted by the quantities newly produced and consumed 
in the market period. At the end of the market period everybody was supposed to hold the 
quantity of assets desired. For that new stock available, a new price vector would be set. The 
process would continue until the quantity of stocks and prices became stationary. This 
situation characterized the second type of equilibrium. From 1952 to 1957, Clower studied the 
static and dynamic properties of these models in order to know if the “stock-flow” market 
structure could be a relevant interface between the theory of choices developed in the 
dissertation and Keynesian theories of the trade cycle. In the absence of conclusive results, the 
project was finally abandoned. 
Both these analyses and the doctoral dissertation will be used to stress Clower’s 
equilibrium and synthesis perspectives. The insights (mainly informal) developed in the 
dissertation are necessary but not sufficient to maintain with absolute confidence that 
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individual disequilibrium and its consequences were outside the field of investigation and that 
the Walrasian theory remained Clower’s base camp all along the way.  
1.1.2 Employment fluctuations, individual equilibrium and tâtonnement dynamics 
Involuntary unemployment was considered as a secondary issue in the “stock-flow” 
program of microfoundation. This concept was not even mentioned in Introduction to 
Mathematical Economics. An empirical argument justified this approach in the doctoral 
dissertation. Clower argued that it was not of fundamental importance to know whether 
workers were voluntarily or involuntarily dismissed during the downturn. The effect on 
economic activity would be the same. Accordingly, in the context of trade cycles studies, it 
would be enough to account for the fluctuations of employment: 
In practice, it is clear that large declines in employment may have the same influence on economic 
activity whether workers were voluntarily or involuntarily unemployed. We leave the matter at that 
(1952: p. 66).    
In spite of this disinterest, Clower (1952) proposed a reflection on how to incorporate 
involuntary unemployment in a market framework. He claimed that there was no theoretical 
difficulty in leaving room for this result: 
One has to make a series of assumption to obtain a supply function equivalent to the one used by 
Keynes (i.e., a function of a form which permits one to talk about “involuntary” unemployment). 
However, since it is always possible to define voluntary unemployment by arbitrarily supposing that 
labor becomes absolutely inelastic in supply at some point on the supply curve, there is little point in 
pursuing such an exercise here (1952: p. 66 underlined by Clower).   
To address involuntary unemployment, it would be enough to assume a horizontal labor 
supply curve. Each point on the perfectly elastic section of this curve was supposed to capture 
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Keynes’ insights.7 That solution, also advocated by Franco Modigliani (1944) and Lange 
(1944)
8
 implied market clearing and so, that workers realized their standard optimization 
programs (De Vroey, 2004). At this stage, Clower therefore viewed involuntary 
unemployment as an equilibrium situation.  
More generally, Clower considered that Keynesian macroeconomics could be rooted 
in a price theory in which all the markets cleared and so, in which all the individuals realized 
their optimizing plans. This clearly appears in the short appendix devoted to the “Keynesian 
system”, in Introduction to Mathematical Economics. Bushaw and Clower aimed at deriving 
the standard IS/LM model from their “stock-flow” price theory (1957: p. 43). The equilibria 
on consumer goods market (c), capital goods market (a), labor market (l) and securities 
market (b) were presented following the syntax of their price theory. Their formalization 
depended on whether they were viewed as a stock, flow or stock-flow markets. The excess-
flow-demand was expressed by X and the excess-stock-demand by X’. It is striking that all 
the markets cleared in their disaggregated system (1957: p. 46): 
 
 
 
                                  
                  
                 
                 
  
This equilibrium perspective is also contemplated in dynamics. As part of the study of 
the stability conditions of the “stock-flow” price theory, in discrete time, Bushaw and Clower 
(1957) insisted on the assumption that at any market period, all the markets cleared: 
This equation expresses the assumption that p₁ (t) and p₂ (t) assume values which make market demand 
equal to market supply at the beginning of each period (1957: p. 84). 
                                                          
7
 For a criticism of this viewpoint, see De Vroey (2004, 2005). 
8
“Involuntary unemployment in the Keynesian sense is not an excess supply of labor but an equilibrium 
position obtained by intersection of a demand and a supply curve, the supply curve of labor, however, being 
infinitely elastic over a wide range with respect to money wages, the point of intersection being to the left of 
the region where elasticity of supply of labor with respect to money wages becomes finite.” (Lange, 1944: p.6) 
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The dynamic path of the economy would be determined by the variations of the stocks of 
commodities in the economy. It was assumed that the stationary equilibrium was reached 
when the net changes of stocks from periods to periods were nil (1957: p. 84). In continuous 
time, the dynamics was based on the same logic. Following economists like Lange (1944) and 
Samuelson (1947), Bushaw and Clower studied the stability properties of tâtonnement 
processes (1954b: p. 343; 1957: p. 101). So, the focus was on the dynamic of abstract 
economies in which disequilibrium transactions were excluded. Individual disequilibrium and 
their consequences were therefore out of the field of investigations in “stock-flow” market 
analyses.  
1.1.3 The compatibility between Walrasian and Keynesian theories 
In the introduction of his dissertation, Clower wondered about the compatibility 
between Walrasian and Keynesian theories. He claimed that the two theories were 
fundamentally compatible. Yet, the deduction of Keynes’ macroeconomics would require 
modifying Walrasian microeconomics: 
From a formal point of view, is the General Theory a special case of established general equilibrium 
theory? Once again, there are essential differences between the two levels of analysis, differences which 
may not be reconcilable until the foundations of general equilibrium theory are broadened (1952: p. 5). 
Clower undertook such modifications. The results appear in appendices, at the end of 
his dissertation. Appendices I and II presented the “producer-consumer” theory of the firm. 
Appendix III presented a reformulation of the standard theory of the consumer, inspired by 
the works of James S. Duesenberry (1949) on interdependent preferences. Clower sought to 
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account for the impact of the relative position of consumers in society on their patterns of 
consumption.
9
 
In several chapters of the dissertation, Clower attempted to provide evidences of the 
compatibility between these microfoundations and Keynesian macroeconomics. This was 
mainly informal, particularly as regards the connections with the “general theory of capital 
accumulation”. Actually, Clower only justified some of its properties. His specific theory of 
the consumer was used to justify the “floor” and the rising trend of the macromodel. The 
maintenance of the consumption, to keep up with the Joneses, would underpin the minimum 
limit of investment at which the economy would rebound. And since this “floor” was 
supposed to depend on the stock of capital assets accumulated and that this stock was likely to 
increase from one depression to another (1952: p. 43), it would grow over time thus 
describing a rising trend. The “producer-consumer” theory of the firm was used to justify the 
articulation of stocks and flows, the central feature of the macromodel. That was presented as 
a relevant foundation for the accelerator (1952: p. 57) and Keynes’ theory of investment 
(1952: p.61). Clower became a bit more precise when he undertook the derivation of relations 
exposed in the General Theory. Though not detailed, a procedure of aggregation was 
followed. Starting from optimization programs, Clower claimed to deduce individual supply 
and demand functions and, by simple summation, to obtain their aggregated versions (1952: 
p. 61; p.63). Clower set these functions. They served to derive components of the aggregate 
demand. Clower considered that “Keynes explicitly assumes that entrepreneurs maximize 
profits” (1952: p.60) and that the theory of investment deduced from the “producer-
consumer” theory of the firm was “equivalent to the theory of Keynes” (1952: p. 62). 
Likewise, Clower maintained that “his [Keynes] consumption analysis is consistent with the 
                                                          
9
 Clower presented in details these modifications of standard microeconomics in two papers: “Mr. Graaff’s 
Producer-Consumer Theory: A Restatement and Correction” (1952a) and “Professor Duesenberry and 
Traditional Theory” (1952b).  
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usual pure theory of consumer behavior” (1952: p. 60). After a few manipulations on the 
demand for goods, Clower claimed to “arrive at the Keynesian propensity to consume, on its 
most familiar form” (1952: p.65). The ad-hoc manipulations of the supply and demand 
functions limited the relevance of Clower’s demonstration. But the problem really lied in the 
absence of formalization of a general equilibrium model. In a program of microfoundations à 
la Hicks (1939), the formulation of a market theory was seen as a crucial step to demonstrate 
that macroeconomics could be deduced from the theory of choices. 
“Stock-flow” market analyses were later developed to fill this gap. The walrasian 
flavor of the general equilibrium models could hardly be overemphasized.
10
 Symmetry and 
market clearing characterized the system of equations (see 1.1.2). And though that was not 
clearly expressed, the simultaneity of decisions was assumed. In Introduction to Mathematical 
Economics, when Bushaw and Clower gave details on the exchange technology underlying 
their “stock-flow” price theory, they referred to a “central market authority” (1957: p. 31) 
expected to set prices so that supplies equaled demands (1957: p. 34).  
Though largely implicit, connections with Keynesian macroeconomics were proposed 
both in partial and general equilibrium frameworks. In partial equilibrium, this concerned the 
liquidity preference theory (1954) and Keynes’ theory of investment (1954a). Clower (1954) 
demonstrated that the dynamic path of the rate of interest was largely determined by the 
excess-stock-demand for bonds, not by the excess-flow-demand for bonds (p. 114). This 
feature was presented as a proof that the rate of interest was governed by speculative 
behaviors, not by saving and investment. Clower (1954a) demonstrated that given different 
levels of the rate of interest, the relation between the stock demand and the associated level of 
net investment could be used to obtain “a curve K(r) which Keynes would call schedule of 
marginal efficiency of capital” (p. 76). In general equilibrium, Bushaw and Clower (1954b) 
                                                          
10
 On the Walrasian representation of the functioning of a market economy, see De Vroey (1999).  
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referred to the project sketched in the doctoral dissertation. The “stock-flow” price theory 
could ground the “models based on the acceleration principle” (1954b: p. 328). The reason 
was dynamic. The articulation of stocks and flows would be a source of instability ignored in 
pure stock and pure flow models (1954b: pp. 341-342).  
In Introduction to Mathematical Economics, Bushaw and Clower recognized that “the 
path from their own (or from any similar model) to the Keynesian system is rather tortuous” 
(1952: p. 44). But in the “Keynesian appendix”, their “discussion [serves to] show that a path 
exists” (1952: p. 44). Starting from the disaggregated system exposed in 1.1.2, they made 
various assumptions and modifications to finally deduce the “Keynesian building block Y= 
C+I” (1957: p. 46) and standard Keynesian functions. Regardless of the rigor of this 
derivation, this proves that Clower considered that Walrasian and Keynesian theories were 
fundamentally compatible.  
1.2 The “general theory of price determination” (1954-1959) 
In parallel with his “stock-flow” program of microfoundation, Clower developed a second 
theoretical project purporting to set a price theory allowing the unification of all forms of 
competition, from monopoly to perfect competition. This emerged out of the debates on the 
realism of the Walrasian theory, held at Cambridge (Massachusetts) by Edward H. 
Chamberlin and Robert Triffin. In this project, the emphasis of Clower’s equilibrium and 
synthesis perspectives requires to scratch the theoretical surface. As a matter of fact, Clower 
considered situations of individual disequilibrium and sought to account for the resulting 
market dynamics. But disequilibrium was not the issue. Actually, the main ingredients of 
disequilibrium economics were absent. For example, the consequences of disequilibrium 
trading (such as income effect) on optimizing behaviors were totally ignored. Then, although 
it is true that Clower shaped various adjustment processes different from the standard excess-
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demands of the Walrasian theory, the goal was not to find an alternative to the tâtonnement 
hypothesis. His “general theory of price determination” is presented as an extension of the 
basic assumptions of the “traditional general equilibrium theory”.  
1.2.1 Overview of the project 
Clower’s project to build a “general theory of price determination” traces its roots in 
two unpublished manuscripts, written over the first half of the fifties: “On the existence of a 
General Theory of Price Determination” (1954i) and “Toward a General Theory of Price 
Determination” (1955). Then, Clower presented his main developments and results in the 
concluding chapter of IME, in three sections titled: “Toward a Generalized Theory of Price 
Determination”, “A Unified Theory of Price and Quantity Determination” and “Monopoly 
and Competition: An Appraisal”. Reflections in this area continued until the end of the fifties 
through unpublished manuscripts and one paper: “On the Microdynamics of Price Formation 
in N-Seller Markets” (1958?), “A Study of Elementary Learning and Response Mechanism in 
Dynamical Monopoly Model” (1958), “Inductive Inference and Business Behavior” (1959)11 
and “Some Theory of an Ignorant Monopolist” (1959i).   
In his first manuscripts, Clower presented his project as a reaction to the debates held 
at Cambridge (Massachusetts) by Chamberlin and Triffin. His reading of Monopolistic 
Competition and General Equilibrium Theory would have been the original impulse. In this 
book, Triffin took up the criticism of his supervisor (Chamberlin) on the lack of realism of 
perfect competition. He proposed to integrate some elements associated to the monopolistic 
competition such as strategic behaviors and firms’ interdependences, in the Walrasian theory 
(Marcuzzo, 2012). This would allow escaping from the partial equilibrium approach that 
characterized the standard monopoly theory whilst improving the empirical content of the 
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 R. W Clower Papers, Box 4, Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library.   
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general equilibrium models (1940: p. 4). In the conclusion of this book, Triffin recognized the 
complexities resulting from the incorporation of these features. He contended that the 
formulation of a price theory as simple and elegant as the Walrasian one would be 
consequently an elusive quest. Economists would have to consider this as “a philosopher’s 
stone” (1940: p. 289).  
Clower reacted to this abandonment. His works on “stock-flow” models would have 
led him to find the way to complete Triffin’s project via the elaboration of a “general theory 
of price determination” including all forms of competition, from monopoly to perfect 
competition: 
As a result of recent work in the theory of competitive price, however, coupled with some thought-
provoking remarks addressed to me by Professor Chamberlin, Professor Triffin’s dictum no longer has 
to be accepted. On the contrary, it is now possible to exhibit a consistent and unified general theory of 
price determination (1954i: p.2 underlined by Clower) 
The key to understand the project is the existence of analogies in the procedure of estimation 
of equilibrium prices. Clower considered that whatever the forms of competition structure, 
individuals (whether a “market authority” embodied by the figure of the broker, a seller or a 
group of sellers) would carry out such estimations trying to avoid unwanted stocks. In perfect 
competition, he pointed out that brokers were responsible for setting equilibrium prices 
following a tâtonnement process. He inferred that a broker could be viewed “as an actual unit 
of economic decision similar to consumer and business units” (1954i: p. 31), supposed to set 
prices following an internal equilibrium condition represented by a “desired excess-demand”. 
The point was that the equilibrium condition of a broker did not match necessarily the market 
one. In this case, he would observe unwanted variations of stocks. This would be a signal to 
revise his estimation of equilibrium prices. The procedure of re-estimation would be at work 
until the brokers’ “desired excess demand” and market excess demand would be 
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simultaneously nil. After having presented this procedure of estimation of equilibrium prices, 
Clower turned to non-competitive structures. He contended that, if the assumption of 
“demand certainty” was dropped, the process of price determination would appear to be 
analogous to the one at work in perfect competition. In a monopoly, the seller decided on the 
level of production by estimating the price at which he would sell the integrality of the 
production and maximize his profits. Of course, he may make mistakes, failing to correctly 
anticipate the objective demand. Accordingly, he would be forced to increase his stocks of 
goods or would not be able to exploit all the profit opportunities. So, a procedure of re-
estimation would be launched until the internal equilibrium coincided with the market 
equilibrium. According to Clower, once this element of uncertainty was introduced in the 
standard monopoly theory, the extension to oligopoly model would be quasi natural. The 
difficulty would lie in the treatment of firms’ interdependences. Because of the presence of 
such analogies in the adjustment processes, Clower thought he had proved the existence of a 
“general price theory” allowing the unification of all forms of competition.12 
To undertake this unification, he proposed to set dynamic systems with various 
adjustment rules describing the behaviors of prices, outputs and realized sales: 
It will now be clear that the more general model is neither competitive nor non-competitive. Instead, it 
is a general theory of market adjustment (1954i: p. 43). 
The difficulty was to define these adjustment processes in a sufficient general way to ensure 
the deduction of specific behaviors related to the market structures. Through the 1950s, 
Clower searched for the best formalization of these adjustment processes: 
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The purpose of this paper is to sketch a unified dynamical foundation for analyzing short run output, 
price, and sales behaviors in n-seller markets of the kind considered in accepted formal theories of 
monopoly, oligopoly and pure competition. Considered in the abstract, all of these theories seem to be 
concerned with a common conceptual problem: given a trading situation in which technically 
homogenous units of a single commodity are produced and offered for sale by one or more independent 
sellers to a mass of prospective buyers, to formulate a self-contained, logically coherent, and intuitively 
satisfying description of the determination of the output, price, and sales of each seller (1958?: p. 1, 
underlined by Clower)  
Of course, the complexity of these dynamic systems made difficult the studies of their 
stability conditions. Most of the time, dynamic analyses were therefore absent. That problem 
of tractability was put forward by Clower to explain why it would be preferable to stick to the 
assumption of perfect competition (1957: p. 190). Since he was unable to find a way to 
simplify these models, the project petered out.  
1.2.2 Disequilibrium was not the issue  
Despite the diversity of models developed by Clower, the same experiment was 
proposed. Clower considered situations in which “individuals” (whether a “market authority”, 
a seller or a group of sellers) set prices and made mistakes thus leading to disequilibrium 
transactions. For example, Clower (1957, 1958?, 1958, 1959, 1959i) assumed that N (N   *) 
independent sellers produced in (t-1) a homogeneous good that they brought to the market in 
t. At the beginning of the market period, they set the price at which they undertook to deliver 
the goods during the market period. The market price was supposed to be the minimum of the 
prices set by sellers. Those who set higher prices would not be able to sell the quantity they 
had planned. Symmetrically, consumers would not be able to realize their consumption plans 
when the quantities sold at the market price were not sufficient. Accordingly, situations of 
individual disequilibria were considered in Clower’s “general theory of price determination”. 
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Yet, three features of these studies show that disequilibrium was not the issue. First, in 
all the papers mentioned, Clower excluded ab ovo the effects of disequilibrium transactions 
on individuals’ choices. The sellers could not integrate the level of demand during the market 
period and readjust their production on this basis. Such adjustments were considered to be at 
work but would have consequences only on the next market period. Second, Clower stuck to 
partial equilibrium approaches. As a result, he ignored the consequences of the non-
realization of optimization programs on other markets, what Patinkin (1956) called “spill-
over” effects. And third, every study was led as if the dynamic properties of the models were 
a secondary issue. Clower set dynamic systems but mainly discuss the properties of their 
equilibria. In that respect, it is striking that he always insisted on market-clearing. Of course, 
this was partly due to the complexity of the dynamic systems. But beyond that, a deeper 
reason, consubstantial with his project, justified this approach. The goal was to demonstrate 
that a single price determination process, with a common criterion (supply/demand balance), 
characterized all forms of competition: 
Therefore, market equilibrium (in monopoly) is defined by the intersection of the supply curve s with 
the demand curve d— a result which is remarquably similar to that which defines market equilibrium 
price in an isolated competitive market! […] Here, precisely as in the case of the monopoly, market 
equilibrium is defined by the intersection of the market supply and demand curves s and d (1957: p. 
189). 
Because of this orientation, Clower was really more interested in full market clearing 
situations.  
1.2.3 The compatibility with the “traditional general equilibrium theory” 
Now, let’s focus on the synthesis perspective. In his first manuscript, Clower claimed 
that his “general theory of price determination” was the result of an extension of the 
“traditional” general equilibrium theory: 
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The [general] theory follows immediately from generally accepted postulate of traditional analysis in 
conjunction with one simple, almost obvious, further assumption which, while already at hand in 
elementary dynamical considerations underlying established analysis, is here utilized for the first time 
(1954i: p.2 underlined by Clower). 
The extension concerned the dynamic procedure of estimation of equilibrium prices as 
suggested by the tâtonnement hypothesis. To stress the existence of a “general theory of price 
determination”, Clower proposed to couple this procedure with the assumption that the 
Walrasian broker did not want to hold unwanted stocks.
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During the development of his project, Clower wondered whether or not simple 
extensions of Walrasian microeconomics were sufficient to account for the kind of behaviors 
addressed in his “general” theory. In 1959, he mentioned the possibility of a break with the 
“traditional price theory”. But he claimed that it was preferable to remain in this framework: 
The inadequacies of traditional price theory as an instrument for describing observed market behavior 
have become increasingly apparent in recent years. It is still an open question, however, whether these 
shortcomings can be removed by appropriate generalizations of existing theories or whether 
modifications of a more fundamental kind will be required. […] It seems to me that both points of view 
entail interesting programs of research and that neither can be said to involve anything more than this at 
the present time.[…] Meanwhile, it is interesting to speculate about the possible fruitfulness of an 
approach which lies somewhere between the two extremes. […] The purpose of the present paper is to 
elaborate upon this theme by sketching a simplified “learning model” of oligopoly which is broadly 
consistent with traditional doctrine yet sufficiently general to include both established monopoly theory 
and the accepted theory of pure competition as special cases (1959i: p. 2). 
Therefore, the compatibility between the “general theory of price determination” and 
Walrasian general equilibrium theory was claimed all along the way.   
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To conclude, from 1949 to 1959, Clower developed two theoretical projects in which 
i) he was never interested by involuntary unemployment and more generally by individual 
disequilibrium its consequences; ii) he always considered that extensions of “established” 
general equilibrium theory were sufficient to build his theoretical models. So, what happened 
to him? How to explain that in little more than three years, at the Royaumont conference 
(1962), he proposed a disequilibrium interpretation of the Keynesian theory whilst defending 
the need to break with Walrasian microeconomics?  
2. Clower’s about-face: Phase II (1960-1962) 
In the early sixties, Clower reopened investigations on Keynesian macroeconomics. In an 
attempt to shed new lights on the Keynes-Classics debate, he radically broke with the 
equilibrium and synthesis perspectives that prevailed until now. That is why these reflections 
are considered as part of another research phase (Phase II). Clower’s about-face took place in 
two steps. Its origins are mysterious. But they are clarified by the intellectual context and the 
invariants of Clower’s works. Clower probably considered that the disequilibrium 
interpretation of the General Theory fostered by Patinkin opened a fruitful avenue of research 
to address the two very issues on which he was working on since his PhD dissertation: the 
microfoundations of Keynesian macroeconomics and the dynamics of market economies. His 
focus on unstable dynamics led him to realize, in reaction to Patinkin’s own contradictions 
and to the developments in non-tâtonnement economics, that a break with the Walrasian 
framework was imperative. Clower’s rejection of Walras’ law makes sense when one realizes 
that this law was violated in the dynamical analysis proposed by Patinkin (1956) in chapter 
XIII, and that Hahn and Negishi (1962) demonstrated that the stability of non-tâtonnement 
processes was partly due to its validity.  
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2.1 A two-step reorientation  
One unpublished manuscript and two papers will be studied to examine Clower’s about-face: 
“Keynes and the Classics: A Reinterpretation” (KCR);14 “Keynes and the Classics: A 
Dynamical Perspective” (1960) and “The Keynesian Counter-Revolution: A Theoretical 
Appraisal” (1965). The debate over Keynes and the Classics was the point of entry in these 
new investigations. In the first two works, Clower displayed a disequilibrium interpretation of 
the General Theory whilst maintaining a synthesis perspective. Clower realized the 
incompatibility between the two theories shortly before presenting the “Counter-Revolution” 
paper, at the Royaumont Conference. 
2.1.1 Disequilibrium and synthesis 
In KCR, Clower proposed a disequilibrium interpretation of the General Theory. The 
main ingredients of disequilibrium economics were mobilized. First, involuntary 
unemployment was the focal point. This concept was viewed as the dividing lines between 
Keynes and the “Classics”, in statics and in dynamics. In the former case, Clower proposed to 
tread on Keynes’ footsteps to show that the “Classical point of full employment equilibrium” 
was an “upper limit to possible equilibrium level of employment in the Keynesian model” 
(KCR, p.7). Yet, according to Clower “the relative merits of Keynesian and Classical 
[theories] cannot be discussed profitably on a static level of analysis (KCR: p. 8). That was 
why he proposed to stress a dynamic interpretation of the Keynes-Classics debate.  The matter 
was instability of the full employment equilibrium in Keynes’s theory versus stability in the 
“classical” theory. Second, involuntary unemployment was presented as a disequilibrium 
situation. When Clower sought to account for the “unlimited number of equilibrium states” in 
Keynes’ General Theory, his ambition was to explain that entrepreneurs could set the volume 
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of employment whilst leaving the labor market in excess supply (KCR, p. 6-7). Third, Clower 
considered involuntary unemployment as a dynamic phenomenon. The demonstration of its 
persistence through the analysis of market adjustment processes was the aim of his 
“dynamical interpretation” of the Keynes-Classics debate (KCR, p. 2).  Fourth and finally, 
Clower intended to account for the consequences of disequilibrium transactions. That was 
what he suggested when he distinguished two scenarios in his dynamic analysis: “Case I: it is 
assumed that all market transactions at output prices other than those which ‘clear the market’ 
are strictly provisional (i.e., if the output market operates according to Walrasian or 
Edgeworthian principles). […] Case II is rather different, for it rests upon Keynes’ version of 
Say’s law; i.e., it depends on the proposition which asserts that “supply creates its own 
demand” in the strictest possible sense” (KCR, p. 9). Here, what Clower called Say’s law in 
the sense of Keynes meant that the model took into account the income constraints imposed 
on workers’ consumption when they failed to sell the quantity of labor planned. By 
assumption, workers would express a demand for goods determined by the level of 
employment imposed by firms. 
It is striking that whilst developing this disequilibrium interpretation of the General 
Theory, Clower kept maintaining that there was no fundamental difference between Keynes 
and the “Classics”. In KCR, Clower contended that the “Classical equilibrium problem 
parallels that given by Keynes in chapter 2 of the General Theory; in particular, it is consistent 
with his treatment in every respect.” And in 1960, he claimed that “the essential formal 
difference between Keynes and the classics is more one of subject matter than of underlying 
postulates” (1960: p. 25). Keynes would have been interested in addressing “depression 
states” while the “Classics” would have been interested in addressing equilibrium situations. 
Accordingly, there would be no problem to synthesize the two theories! 
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2.1.2 Disequilibrium and break with Walrasian microeconomics 
This position radically changed shortly before the Royaumont conference (held from 
03/08/1962 to 04/07/1962). A letter sent to Patinkin on March 1962 is often quoted to show 
Clower’s break with Walrasian microeconomics (Backhouse and Boianovsky, 2013: p. 50; 
Rubin, 2005: p.18). Here, Clower’s radical reorientation is emphasized drawing from a letter 
sent to G. Delehanty (Massachusetts Institute of Technology): 
The heart of the problem seems to be that Keynes, unlike the specialists in tâtonnement economics, 
assumes that market excess demands depend in part on the level of current transactions (that is to say, 
income flows). Dependence upon income as an independent variable is obviously inconsistent with 
traditional preference analysis since, if income is taken as given it is not possible to define factor supply 
functions. Why this difficulty has not been noticed before I cannot say, but I can tell you that it is more 
difficult to get over than one might suspect at first sight. My own proposal is a kind of dual decision 
theory of the consumer, which makes sense in a dynamic context, and happens to include traditional 
preference analysis as a special case – valid under full employment conditions (Letter from Clower to 
Delehanty, 02/19/1962).
15 
The argument mentioned was the heart of the 1965 piece. Clower realized that Keynesian 
relations such as the consumption function could not be derived from Walrasian 
microeconomics. The reason was that realized income was considered as an independent 
variable in Keynes’ theory, while it was not in the Walrasian theory. In the later, individuals 
were supposed to chose their income by defining their selling and purchasing plans at the 
same moment. Income was endogenous. No adjustment of consumption was possible, unless 
prices varied. As a result, realized income could not act as a constraint in the Walrasian 
demand for consumption goods (labeled “notional”, in opposition to the “effective” demands 
of the Keynesian theory). For that to be possible, Clower contended that an alternative theory 
of the consumer was required. His idea was to drop the assumption of a systematic 
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synchronization between the decisions to buy and sell, in a context were individuals could 
trade out of the equilibrium. This de-synchronization characterized the so-called “dual-
decision” hypothesis.  
2.2 Why such an about-face? 
On two occasions, Clower suddenly reoriented his interpretation of Keynesian economics. 
The circumstances of these reorientations remain mysterious. Yet, the intellectual context 
with and the invariants of Clower’s analytical approaches shed some light on this about-face.  
2.2.1 Patinkin’s influence on Clower’s break with the equilibrium perspective 
There is a coincidence in time between the emergence of Clower’s disequilibrium 
interpretation of the General Theory and the beginning of his interactions with Patinkin. At 
the end of the fifties, Clower and Patinkin started a correspondence. Initially, Clower reacted 
to “Liquidity Preference and Loanable Funds: Stocks and Flow Analysis” (1958), a paper in 
which Patinkin questioned the validity of Walras’ law in situations of involuntary 
unemployment. Then, the two authors started a new correspondence on monetary theory in 
reaction to the publication of G.C Archibald and R.G Lipsey (1958)’s paper “Monetary and 
Value Theory: A Critique of Lange and Patinkin”. In this context, Clower repeatedly 
expressed his admiration and his interest for the reasoning developed in Money, Interest and 
Prices:
16
 
Re-reading your book, I am more than ever impressed by the consistency of the analysis – given the 
assumptions—and with the absence of anything but minor slips (Letter from Clower to Patinkin, 
03/10/1959, Don Patinkin Papers, Box 25). 
Although Patinkin’s unemployment theory was not discussed in these 
correspondences, there are strong grounds for believing that it was not a simple fact of timing 
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if Clower wrote KCR at the same moment. First, like Clower, Patinkin sought to provide 
microfoundations to Keynesian macroeconomics. And like him too, Patinkin insisted on the 
need to understand the dynamics of market economies. To be more specific, Patinkin 
proposed to explain involuntary unemployment as a dynamic phenomenon. Workers’ inability 
to realize their Walrasian optimizing plans induced pressures on wages which, in turn, 
provoked market adjustments. These were the two points of entry in Clower’s reconsideration 
of Keynes’ General Theory. In KCR, behind the label “Keynes-Classics debate”, Clower 
really addressed the compatibility between Walrasian and Keynesian theories and the stability 
of the market economy (see 2.1). 
Second, the theoretical proximity between the two authors is undeniable. In KCR, 
Clower nearly paraphrased Patinkin (1956) to criticize Keynes (1936) for having defined 
involuntary unemployment as an equilibrium situation: 
Perhaps the most curious aspect of the matter is the fact that if w and p just happen to fall at the same 
rate of time then, starting from an initial position of Keynesian equilibrium (with excess supply in the 
labor market), the economy will remain ‘in equilibrium’ indefinitely although prices and wages are 
constantly falling over time! Under these circumstances, it is perhaps natural to speak of the difference 
   -    as ‘involuntary unemployment’; but it is a curious of language to refer to the situation as a 
whole as one of equilibrium (KCR, p. 13 underlined by Clower). 
All, then that Keynes means by the statement that the system may settle down to a position of 
‘unemployment equilibrium’ is that the automatic workings of the system will not restore the system to 
a position of full employment equilibrium. He does not mean ‘equilibrium’ in the usual sense of the 
term that nothing tends to change in the system. All that is strictly in equilibrium is the level—or, 
possibly, only the fact—of unemployment; but there is no equilibrium of the money wage rate (1956: p. 
471). 
Likewise, he nearly paraphrased Patinkin to emphasize the need to use dynamics to 
capture Keynes’ theory of involuntary unemployment: 
28 
 
Although Keynes himself never made a complete transition from statical to dynamical modes of 
thought, his work prompted many of his contemporaries to do precisely this, and so wrought a 
fundamental change in intellectual perspective in the space of few years […] The fruits of the 
Keynesian Revolution have been, and are being, gathered primarily by a new generation of economists, 
a generation that has finally accustomed itself to thinking in terms of points and planes instead of curves 
and crosses (1960: p. 323). 
Indeed, it is the very departure from these curves, and the resulting striving of individuals to return to 
the optimal behavior which they represent, which provides the motive power of the dynamic process 
itself. Thus our task in studying involuntary unemployment is to free ourselves of the mental habit – 
long ingrained by the methods of static analysis – of seeing only the points on the demand or supply 
curve (1956: p. 220 underlined by Patinkin). 
Lastly, Clower resorted to the logic of the “spill-over effect” in the disequilibrium 
model put forward in KCR. The same mechanism underlined his application of “Keynes’ 
version of Say’s law”. Patinkin described the behavior of entrepreneurs that failed to sell the 
quantity of goods they had planned. They would integrate the level of demand as an 
additional constraint and would redefine their labor demand. Clower described the income 
constraints imposed on workers’ consumption when they failed to sell the quantity of works 
they had planned, which was simply the symmetric effect.  
Whilst taking up central ideas shaped by Patinkin (1956; 1958), Clower finally 
considered that the Walrasian and Keynesian theories were fundamentally incompatible, a 
position diametrically opposed to those held in Money, Interest and Prices. How does one 
explain that? 
2.2.2 Clower’s break with the Walrasian framework  
Rubin (2005) considered that the roots of Clower’s break with the Walrasian 
framework lie in Patinkin’s own contradictions. Whilst studying their respective positions on 
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the validity of Walras’ law, he showed that Patinkin (1956; 1958) preferred contradicting 
himself rather than rejecting the Walrasian framework. Clower (1965) would have identified 
the gaps and would have drawn the consequences that the invalidation of Walras’ law was the 
sine qua non of the Keynesian theory: 
Either Walras’ law is incompatible with Keynesian economics, or Keynes had nothing fundamentally 
new to add to orthodox economic theory (1965: p.41). 
Rubin’s viewpoint is here reinforced by putting Patinkin’s contradictions in 
perspective with the contemporaneous development in “non-tâtonnement” economics and 
with Clower’s ambition to account for the instability of market economies, in his 
disequilibrium theory.  
The dynamics of market economies and, more specifically, the possibility of a 
continuous depression was core to Clower’s disequilibrium interpretation of the General 
Theory: 
On the other hand, any point which lies on the demand curve but above the supply curve refers to a state 
of involuntary unemployment in the sense of Keynes. […] Under the latter circumstances, the marginal 
utility of the real wage exceeds the marginal disutility of labor, whereas the marginal product of labor is 
equal to real wage; hence households alone have an incentive to expand employment. By analogy with 
situations of a similar sort experienced in practice, it is natural to regard these as ‘depression’ states of 
the model. The interesting thing about ‘depression’ states is that it is not directly plausible to say that 
they cannot persist indefinitely. No doubt it can be asserted, with good reasons that any particular 
‘depression’ state tends to be followed by another ‘depression’ state, and so on, indefinitely. This is 
clearly a dynamical stability question (1960: p. 23 underlined by Clower). 
A disequilibrium model would have to account for i) the rationing suffered by workers on the 
market for labor; ii) the pressures on wages resulting from their incentive to change the 
employment situation; and iii) the dynamic of the whole economy, given that entrepreneurs 
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have no interest to modify the employment situation. In this context, Clower insisted on the 
possibility that the economy might stick to a depression state – another issue on which he was 
working on since his PhD dissertation. That was a scenario considered by Keynes (1936) and 
that Clower wanted to account within his disequilibrium theory of unemployment.  
In view of this, the contributions of Patinkin (1956; 1958) on one side, and of Hahn 
and Negishi (1962) on the other side, may explain why the rejection of Walras’ law became a 
focal point. In chapter XIII, section II of Money, Interest and Prices, Patinkin broke with 
Walras’ law when he explained the dynamic of his disequilibrium model. In situation of 
involuntary unemployment, the excess demands for goods and labor were based on notional 
supplies and effective demands so that their sum (weighted by market prices) would be less 
than zero. Then, in 1958, Patinkin questioned the validity of this law in Keynesian 
macroeconomics. He realized that the formulation of involuntary unemployment as a 
rationing in the labor market questioned its validity. By virtue of this law, it would not be 
possible to have an excess-supply in the labor market without having an excess-demand 
elsewhere in the economic system:  
Walras’ law relates to an economy in which all markets are in equilibrium. In the case of involuntary 
unemployment, on the other hand, there exists a state of excess supply –and hence of continued 
disequilibrium – in the market for labor. At first sight then, there would seem to be no place for the 
operation of Walras’ law (1958: p. 314). 
In spite of these contradictions with his disequilibrium interpretation of the General 
Theory, Patinkin sought to maintain the validity of Walras’ law. To do so, he assumed that 
workers adjusted passively their labor supply to the demand for labor: 
One way out of this difficulty (there may well be others) is to assume it away by attributing to workers a 
completely passive behavior pattern according to which they adjust the amount of labor they plan to 
supply to the amount employers demand at the going wage rate (1958: p. 314). 
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This way, “equilibrium always exists in the labor market” (1958: p. 314) and so, Walras’ law 
was respected. Patinkin realized that this solution “dodges the real difficulties” (1958: p. 315). 
But the problem really was that the very existence of his disequilibrium analysis was in 
question. If the labor market was in “equilibrium”, the dynamic pressure supposed to act on 
wages in situation of involuntary unemployment did no longer exist. Accordingly, involuntary 
unemployment stopped being a dynamic phenomenon and so, Keynesian macroeconomics 
lost its status of disequilibrium theory. In a different way, the contemporaneous development 
in non-tâtonnement economics also emphasized the dynamic consequences of keeping 
Walras’ law valid. Hahn and Negishi (1962) demonstrated that a general equilibrium system 
with disequilibrium transactions but in which Walras’ law held good was stable. Clower may 
have heard about this article before the Royaumont conference since he was in touch with 
Negishi at least since 1961.
17
 And of course, as a careful reader of Patinkin’s works, he surely 
noted his contradictions. In view of this, Clower may have considered that to discard Walras’ 
law was a precondition to account for the unstable dynamics of market economies, in a 
disequilibrium model. 
In fact, that was the theoretical message underlying the 1965 piece. Clower maintained 
that a break with the Walrasian framework was the key to vindicate the Keynesian 
heterodoxy. That was suggested in section II of the “Counter-Revolution” paper when he 
established a link between three “Keynesian indictments”: the instability of the full 
employment equilibrium, the reject of Walras’ law and the breaching of the “second 
postulate”: 
The first item in his [Keynes] bill of particulars is embedded in a lengthy discussion of wage bargains 
between entrepreneurs and workers. Outwardly, this item represents little more than a vigorous attack 
on orthodox preconceptions about the stability of a market economy. For the burden of his argument 
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seems to be that if labor is ever forced to move ‘off its supply curve’ it may be unable to get back on 
again. If this is an accurate interpretation, we may say immediately that Keynes’ criticism is not of 
fundamental theoretical significance, for there is no reason to suppose that Keynes was more expert on 
stability analysis than his orthodox predecessor. However, the same argument might also be interpreted 
as a direct attack on the orthodox theory of household behavior. This would certainly put labor off its 
supply curve and would also explain Keynes’ categorical rejection of postulate II. But if this is what 
Keynes intended, i.e., to deny the validity of the orthodox theory of household behavior, one can only 
say that he was singularly unsuccessful in providing a rationale for his attack (1965: p. 40).  
Thanks to the formulation of the “dual-decision” hypothesis, Clower thought he had 
found the way to link these indictments and so, the key to understand the Keynesian 
heterodoxy. Walras’ law would be the piece hinged, thus explaining why Clower insisted so 
much on his rejection. The core of the “Counter-Revolution” paper was devoted to the 
relation between the “dual-decision” hypothesis and Walras’ law. Clower demonstrated that 
the substitution of the “constrained demand” to the notional one turned Walras’ equality into 
an inequality in case of involuntary unemployment (1965: p. 53). Thus, the model would 
admit situations in which there could have an excess supply in the labor market without 
necessarily an excess demand in the market for goods. This is the best known part of his 
argumentation, which is not the case of the relation between Walras’ law and the instability of 
the full employment equilibrium. Clower contended that its validity entailed the existence of 
symmetric pressures on wage and price so that the return to the full employment equilibrium 
was ensured (1965: p. 52). But what would be the dynamic path of the economy if it was 
rejected? To answer this question, Clower considered a “typical” Keynesian situation in 
which the labor market was in excess supply and the market for goods cleared. Workers 
would consume the quantity of goods sold by employers (1965: p. 54). Although he did not 
express his position clearly, he seemed to have the idea that the economy might not return to a 
situation of full employment equilibrium: 
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The point of the example is merely to illustrate that, when income appears as an independent variable in 
the market excess-demand functions – more generally, when transactions quantities enter into the 
definition of these functions – traditional price theory ceases to shed any light on the dynamic stability 
of a market economy (1965: p. 55). 
Since the disequilibrium theory sketched in the 1965 piece could integrate consistently 
the three main “Keynesian indictments”, Clower firmly believed that he was taking the right 
direction to ground Keynes’ economics. During the Royaumont conference, Clower ended the 
discussion of his paper by claiming that he was able to provide a faithful microfounded 
general equilibrium account of the General Theory: 
In conclusion of his discussion, Clower described the purpose and message of his paper. He thought that 
people, including himself had failed to understand that there was a general equilibrium interpretation of 
Keynes, namely the one he had developed, which made all of the more familiar interpretation in terms 
of equational inconsistencies, rigid wages, liquidity traps, etc., unnecessary (1965a: p.309).
18
  
This craze also explained why Clower did not hesitate to proclaim his heterodoxy and to 
violently reject Walrasian microeconomics.  
Conclusion 
My paper aimed at explaining the genesis of the “Counter-Revolution” paper. This 
was a difficult task since it entailed solving the mystery which, very often, surrounded 
Clower’s contributions. He was an economist who had ambitions, asked important questions 
to understand the functioning of market economies, and always provided promising intuitions 
to answer. But he rarely succeeded in formalizing the models that fully supported his views. 
So, intuitions were often put in the back burner. This made difficult to capture his thought. 
                                                          
18
 This quotation is from the record of the discussions held at the Royaumont conference, published by Hahn 
and Brechling in 1965.  
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Because of that, an archival work was necessary. It helped to reveal the intuitions, the 
intellectual influences and the aims contemplated.  
Backhouse and Boianovsky (2013) proposed a first important study, notably because 
they initiated the use of Clower’s archives. They maintained that the “Counter-Revolution” 
paper resulted from an independent research program rooted in the works of Clower during 
the 1950s. Independency and linearity therefore characterized their account of Clower’s 
intellectual path. Instead, my paper has showed that the two salient features of this path were 
the dependency (to an intellectual context mainly composed of Hicks and Patinkin) and the 
rupture (with equilibrium and synthesis perspectives). This is summed up in the following 
table: 
 Phase I Phase II 
The “General Theory 
of the Trade Cycle” 
(1949-1957) 
The “General 
Theory of Price 
Determination” 
(1954-1959) 
The “General Theory 
of Income 
Determination” 
(1960-1962) 
 
 
 
Main intellectual 
background 
i) The post-
Keynesian theories 
of the trade cycle 
(Harrod, 1939; 
Hicks, 1950); ii) 
Microfoundations of 
macroeconomics 
(Hicks, 1939) 
The debates on 
the realism of 
perfect 
competition 
(Chamberlin, 
1933; Triffin, 
1940) 
i) Disequilibrium 
microfoundations of 
Keynesian 
macroeconomics 
(Patinkin, 1956, 
1958) 
Were individual 
disequilibrium 
and its 
consequences the 
focal points? 
No No Yes 
Was a break with 
standard 
Walrasian theory 
considered to be 
necessary? 
No 
 
No Yes 
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Here, the 1965 piece is presented as the result of an about-face, mainly prompted by 
Patinkin (1956; 1958)’s disequilibrium interpretation of the General Theory. Clower (1965)’s 
advocacy of a disequilibrium theory and of a break with Walrasian microeconomics were two 
ideas which were opposed to those defended until the 1960s. In the first two theoretical 
project developed in the 1950s, Clower did not intend to leave room for involuntary 
unemployment, and more generally, for individual disequilibrium and its consequences. 
Moreover, he considered that simple extensions of the Walrasian general equilibrium theory 
(often called “traditional” price theory) were sufficient to undertake the construction of his 
models. That is why a theoretical about-face really underlined the “Counter-Revolution” 
paper. In view of the interactions between Patinkin and Clower at that time, there are strong 
grounds for believing that the author of Money, Interest and Prices played a crucial role in 
this sudden reorientation. This is surprising to say the least since in the 1965 piece, Clower 
violently Patinkin (1956)’s program of microfoundation, judging it as “counter-
revolutionary”. This attitude may explain why the two authors failed to see the deep proximity 
of their analyses when they met at the Royaumont Conference.  
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